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First BookPart III
Part III
I ensure you, Master Raphael, quoth I, I took great delectation in
hearing you: all things that you said were spoken so wittily and so
pleasantly. And me thought myself to be in the meantime, not only at home in
my country, but also through the pleasant remembrance of the Cardinal, in
whose house I was brought up of a child, to wax a child again. And, friend
Raphael, though I did bear very great love towards you before, yet seeing you
do so earnestly favour this man, you will not believe how much my love towards
you is now increased. But yet, all this not withstanding, I can by no means
change my mind, but that I must needs believe, that you, if you be
disposed, and can find in your heart to follow some prince`s court, shall
with your good counsels greatly help and further the commonwealth.
Wherefore there is nothing more appertaining to your duty, that is to say,
to the duty of a good man. For whereas your Plato judgeth that weal publics
shall by this means attain perfect felicity, either if philosophers be
kings, or else if kings give themselves to the study of philosophy, how far
I pray you, shall commonwealths then be from this felicity, if philosophers
will [not] vouchsafe to instruct kings with their good counsel?
They be not so unkind (quoth he) but they would gladly do it, yea, many
have done it already in books that they have put forth, if kings and princes
would be willing and ready to follow good counsel. But Plato doubtless did
well foresee, unless kings themselves would apply their minds to the study of
Philosophy, that else they would never thoroughly allow the counsel of
philosophers, being themselves before even from their tender age infected,
and corrupt with perverse and evil opinions. Which thing Plato himself
proved true in King Dionysius. If I should propose to any king wholesome
decrees, doing my endeavour to pluck out of his mind the pernicious original
causes of vice and naughtiness, think you not that I should forthwith either
be driven away, or else made a laughing stock? Go to, suppose that I were with
the French king, and there sitting in his council, whiles that in that most
secret consultation, the king himself there being present in his own person,
they beat their brains and search the very bottoms of their wits to discuss by
what craft and means the king may still keep Milan, and draw to him again
fugitive Naples, and then how to conquer the Venetians, and how to bring
under his jurisdiction all Italy, then how to win the dominion of Flanders,
Brabant, and of all Burgundy: with divers other lands, whose kingdoms he
hath long ago in mind and purpose invaded. Here whiles one counselleth
to conclude a league of peace with the Venetians, which shall so long
endure, as shall be thought meet and expedient for their purpose, and to
make them also of their counsel, yea, and besides that to give them part of
the prey, which afterward, when they have brought their purpose about after
their own minds, they may require and claim again. Another thinketh best to
hire the Germans. Another would have the favour of the Swiss won with money.
Another`s advice is to appease the puissant power of the Emperor`s majesty
with gold, as with a most pleasant and acceptable sacrifice. Whiles another
giveth counsel to make peace with the King of Arragon, and to restore unto
him his own kingdom of Navarre, as a full assurance of peace. Another cometh
in with his five eggs, and adviseth to hook in the King of Castile with some
hope of affinity or alliance, and to bring to their part certain peers of
his court for great pensions. Whiles they all stay at the chiefest doubt of
all, what to do in the meantime with England, and yet agree all in this to
make peace with the Englishmen, and with most sure and strong bonds to bind
that weak and feeble friendship, so that they must be called friends, and had
in suspicion as enemies. And that therefore the Scots must be had in a
readiness, as it were in a standing, ready at all occasions, if peradventure
the Englishmen should stir never so little, incontinent to set upon them.
And moreover privily and secretly (for openly it may not be done by the truce
that is taken ) privily therefore I say to make much of some peer of England
that is banished his country, which must claim title to the crown of the
realm, and affirm himself just inheritor thereof, that by this subtle means
they may hold to them the king, in whom else they have but small trust and
affiance. Here I say, where so great and high matters be in consultation,
where so many noble and wise men counsel their king only to war, here if
I silly man should rise up and will them to turn over the leaf, and learn a
new lesson, saying that my counsel is not to meddle with Italy, but to
tarry still at home, and that the kingdom of France alone is almost greater,
than that it may well be governed of one man: so that the king should not
need to study how to get more; and then should propose unto them the decrees
of the people that be called the Achoriens, which be situate over against
the island of Utopia on the southeast side. These Achoriens once made war
in their king`s quarrel for to get him another kingdom, which he laid
claim unto, and advanced himself right inheritor to the crown thereof, by
the title of an old alliance. At the last when they had gotten it, and saw
that they had even as much vexation and trouble in keeping it, as they had
in getting it, and that either their new conquered subjects by sundry
occasions were making daily insurrections to rebel against them, or else that
other countries were continually with divers inroads and foragings invading
them: so that they were ever fighting either for them, or against them, and
never could break up their camps: seeing themselves in the mean season pilled
and impoverished: their money carried out of the realm: their own men killed
to maintain the glory of another nation; when they had no war, peace nothing
better than war, by reason that their people in war had inured themselves to
corrupt and wicked manners, that they had taken a delight and pleasure in
robbing and stealing: that through manslaughter they had gathered boldness
to mischief: that their laws were had in contempt, and nothing set by or
regarded: that their king being troubled with the charge and governance of
two kingdoms, could not nor was not able perfectly to discharge his office
towards them both: seeing again that all these evils and troubles were
endless: at the last laid their heads together, and like faithful and loving
subjects gave to their king free choice and liberty to keep still the one of
these two kingdoms whether he would: alleging that he was not able to keep
both, and that they were more than might well be governed of half a king:
forasmuch as no man would be content to take him for his muleteer, that
keepeth another man`s mules besides his. So this good prince was constrained
to be content with his old kingdom and to give over the new to one of his
friends. Which shortly after was violently driven out. Furthermore if I
should declare unto them, that all this busy preparance to war, whereby so
many nations for his sake should be brought into a troublesome hurly-burly,
when all his coffers were emptied, his treasures wasted and his people
destroyed, should at the length through some mischance be in vain and to none
effect: and that therefore it were best for him to content himself with his
own kingdom of France, as his forefathers and predecessors did before him; to
make much of it, to enrich it, and to make it as flourishing as he could, to
endeavour himself to love his subjects, and again to be beloved of them,
willingly to live with them, peaceably to govern them, and with other
kingdoms not to meddle, seeing that which he hath already is even enough for
him, yea, and more than he can well turn him to: this mine advice, Master
More, how think you it would be heard and taken?
So God help me not very thankfully, quoth I.
Well let us proceed then, quoth he. Suppose that some king and his
council were together whetting their wits, and devising what subtle craft
they might invent to enrich the king with great treasures of money. First one
counselleth to raise and enhance the valuation of money when the king must
pay any: and again to call down the value of coin to less than it is worth,
when he must receive or gather any. For thus great sums shall be paid with a
little money, and where little is due much shall be received. Another
counselleth to feign war, that when under this colour and pretence the king
hath gathered great abundance of money, he may, when it shall please him,
make peach with great solemnity and holy ceremonies, to blind the eyes of
the poor commonalty, as taking pity and compassion God wot upon man`s blood,
like a loving and a merciful prince. Another putteth the king in remembrance
of certain old and moth-eaten laws, that of long time have not been put in
execution, which because no man can remember that they were made, every
man hath transgressed. The fines of these laws he counselleth the king to
require: for there is no way so profitable nor more honourable, as the
which hath a show and colour of justice. Another adviseth him to forbid many
things under great penalties and fines, specially such things as is for the
people`s profit not to be used, and afterward to dispense for money with
them, which by this prohibition sustain loss and damage. For by this means
the favour of the people is won, and profit riseth two ways. First by taking
forfeits of them whom covetousness of gains hath brought in danger of this
statute, and also by selling privileges and licenses, which the better that
the prince is, forsooth the dearer he selleth them: as one that is loath to
grant to any private person anything that is against the profit of his
people. And therefore may sell none but at an exceeding dear price. Another
giveth the king counsel to end anger unto his grace the judges of the realm,
that he may have them ever on his side, which must in every matter dispute
and reason for the king`s right. And they must be called into the king`s
palace and be desired to argue and discuss his matters in his own presence.
So there shall be no matter of his so openly wrong and unjust, wherein one or
other of them, either because he will have something to allege and object, or
that he is ashamed to say that which is said already, or else to pick a thank
with his prince, will not find some hole open to set a snare in, wherewith to
take the contrary part in a trip. Thus whiles the judges cannot agree among
themselves, reasoning and arguing of that which is plain enough, and bringing
the manifest truth in doubt: in the mean season the king may take a fit
occasion to understand the law as shall most make for his advantage,
whereunto all other for shame, or for fear will agree. Then the judges may be
bold to pronounce of the king`s side. For he that giveth sentence for the
king, cannot be without a good excuse. For it shall be sufficient for him to
have equity of his part, or the bare words of the law, or a writhen and
wrested understanding of the same, or else (which with good and just judges
is of greater force than all laws be) the king`s indisputable prerogative. To
conclude, all the councillors agree and consent together with the rich
Crassus, that no abundance of gold can be sufficient for a prince, which must
keep and maintain an army: furthermore that a king, though he would, can do
nothing unjustly. For all that all men have, yea also the men themselves be
all his. And that every man hath so much of his own, as the king`s gentleness
hath not taken from him. And that it shall be most for the king`s advantage,
that his subjects have very little or nothing in their possession, as whose
safeguard doth herein consist, that his people do not wax wanton and wealthy
through riches and liberty, because where these things be, there men be not
wont patiently to obey hard, unjust, and unlawful commandments; whereas on
the other part need and poverty doth hold down and keep under stout
courages, and maketh them patient perforce, taking from them bold and
rebelling stomachs. Here again if I should rise up, and boldly affirm that
all these counsels be to the king dishonour and reproach, whose honour and
safety is more and rather supported and upholden by the wealth and riches
of his people, than by his own treasures: and if I should declare that the
commonalty chooseth their king for their own sake and not for his sake:
for this intent, that through his labour and study they might all live
wealthily, safe from wrongs and injuries: and that therefore the king ought to
take more care for the wealth of his people, than for his own wealth, even as
the office and duty of a shepherd is in that he is a shepherd, to feed his
sheep rather than himself. For as touching this, that they think the defence
and maintenance of peace to consist in the poverty of the people, the thing
itself showeth that they be far out of the way. For where shall a man find
more wrangling, quarrelling, brawling, and chiding, than among beggars? Who be
more desirous of new mutations and alterations, than they that be not content
with the present state of their life? Or finally who be bolder stomached to
bring all in hurly-burly (thereby trusting to get some windfall) than they
that have now nothing to lose? And if so be that there were any king that were
so smally regarded, so behated of his subjects, that other ways he could not
keep them in awe, but only by open wrongs, by polling and shaving, and by
bringing them to beggary, surely it were better for him to forsake his
kingdom, than to hold it by this means: whereby though the name of a king be
kept, yet the majesty is lost. For it is against the dignity of a king to have
rule over beggars, but rather over rich and wealthy men. Of this mind was the
hardy and courageous Fabricius, when he said, that he had rather be a ruler of
rich men, than be rich himself. And verily one man to live in pleasure and
wealth, whiles all other weep and smart for it, that is the part, not of a
king, but of jailer. To be short, as he is a foolish physician, that cannot
cure his patient`s disease, unless he cast him in another sickness, so he that
cannot amend the lives of his subjects, but by taking from them the wealth and
commodity of life, he must needs grant that he knoweth not the feat how to
govern free men. But let him rather amend his own life, renounce unhonest
pleasures, and forsake pride. For these be the chief vices that cause him to
run in the contempt or hatred of his people. Let him live of his own, hurting
no man. Let him do cost not above his power. Let him restrain wickedness. Let
him prevent vices, and take away the occasions of offences by well ordering
his subjects, and not by suffering wickedness to increase afterward to be
punished. Let him not be too hasty in calling again laws, which a custom hath
abrogated: specially such as have been long forgotten, and never lacked nor
needed. And let him never under the cloak and pretence of transgression take
such fines and forfeits, as no judge will suffer a private person to take, as
unjust and full of guile. Here if I should bring forth before them the law of
the Macariens, which be not far distant from Utopia: whose king the day of his
coronation is bound by a solemn oath, that he shall never at any time have in
his treasure above a thousand pounds of gold or silver. They say a very good
king, which took more care for the wealth and commodity of his country, than
for the enriching of himself, made this law to be a stop and a bar to kings
for heaping and hoarding up so much money as might impoverish their people.
For he foresaw that this sum of treasure would suffice to support the king in
battle against his own people, if they should chance to rebel: and also to
maintain his wars against the invasions of his foreign enemies. Again he
perceived the same stock of money to be too little and insufficient to
encourage and enable him wrongfully to take away other men`s goods: which was
the chief cause why the law was made. Another cause was this. He thought that
by this provision his people should not lack money, wherewith to maintain
their daily occupying and chaffer. And seeing the king could not choose but
lay out and bestow all that came in above the prescript sum of his stock, he
thought he would seek no occasions to do his subjects injury. Such a king
shall be feared of evil men, and loved of good men. These, and such other
informations, if I should use among men wholly inclined and given to the
contrary part, how deaf hearers think you should I have?
Deaf hearers doubtless (quoth I) and in good faith no marvel. And to
speak as I think, truly I cannot allow that such communication shall be used,
or such counsel given, as you be sure shall never be regarded nor received.
For how can so strange informations be profitable, or how can they be beaten
into their heads, whose minds be already prevented with clean contrary
persuasions? This school philosophy is not unpleasant among friends in
familiar communication, but in the councils of kings, where great matters be
debated and reasoned with great authority, these things have no place.
That is it which I meant (quoth he) when I said philosophy had no place
among kings.
Indeed (quoth I) this school philosophy hath not, which thinketh all
things meet for every place. But there is another philosophy more civil, which
knoweth, as ye would say, her own stage, and thereafter ordering and behaving
herself in the play that she hath in hand, playeth her part accordingly with
comeliness, uttering nothing out of due order and fashion. And this is the
philosophy that you must use. Or else whiles a comedy of Plautus is playing,
and the vile bondmen scoffing and trifling among themselves, if you should
suddenly come upon the stage in a philosopher`s apparel, and rehearse out of
Octavia the place wherein Seneca disputeth with Nero: had it not been better
for you to have played the dumb person, than by rehearsing that, which served
neither for the time nor place, to have made such a tragical comedy or
gallimaufry? For by bringing in other stuff that nothing appertaineth to the
present matter, you must needs mar and pervert the play that is in hand,
though the stuff that you bring be much better. What part soever you have
taken upon you, play that as well as you can and make the best of it: and do
not therefore disturb and bring out of order the whole matter, because that
another, which is merrier, and better, cometh to your remembrance. So the case
standeth in a commonwealth, and so it is in the consultations of kings and
princes. If evil opinions and naughty persuasions cannot be utterly and quite
plucked out of their hearts, if you cannot, even as you would, remedy vices,
which use and custom hath confirmed: yet for this cause you must not leave
and forsake the commonwealth: you must not forsake the ship in a tempest,
because you cannot rule and keep down the winds. No, nor you must not labour
to drive into their heads new and strange informations, which you know well
shall be nothing regarded with them that be of clean contrary minds. But you
must with a crafty wile and a subtle train study and endeavour yourself, as
much as in you lieth, to handle the matter wittily and handsomely for the
purpose, and that which you cannot turn to good, so to order it that it be not
very bad. For it is not possible for all things to be well, unless all men
were good. Which I think will not be yet this good many years.
By this means (quoth he) nothing else will be brought to pass, but whiles
that I go about to remedy the madness of others, I should be even as mad as
they. For if I would speak things that be true, I must needs speak such
things; but as for to speak false things, whether that be a philosopher`s part
or no; I cannot tell, truly it is not my part. Howbeit this communication of
mine, though per-adventure it may seem unpleasant to them, yet can I not see
why it should seem strange, or foolishly newfangled. If so be that I should
speak those things that Plato feigneth in his weal public: or that the
Utopians do in theirs, these things though they were (as they be indeed)
better, yet they might seem spoken out of place. Forasmuch as here amongst us,
every man hath his possessions several to himself, and there all things be
common. But what was in my communication contained, that might not, and ought
not in any place to be spoken? Saving that to them which have thoroughly
decreed and determined with themselves to roam headlong the contrary way, it
cannot be acceptable and pleasant, because it calleth them back, and showeth
them the jeopardies. Verily if all things that evil and vicious manners have
caused to seem inconvenient and nought should be refused, as things unmeet and
reproachful, then we must among Christian people wink at the most part of all
those things, which Christ taught us, and so strictly forbade them to be
winked at, that those things also which he whispered in the ears of his
disciples, he commanded to be proclaimed in open houses. And yet the most
part of them is more dissident from the manners of the world nowadays, than my
communication was. But preachers, sly and wily men, following your counsel (as
I suppose) because they saw men evil willing to frame their manners to
Christ`s rule, they have wrested and perverted his doctrine, and like a rule
of lead have applied it to men`s manners: that by some means at the leastways,
they might agree together. Whereby I cannot see what good they have done: but
that men may more sickerly be evil. And I truly should prevail even as much in
king`s councils. For either I must say otherways than they say, and then I
were as good to say nothing, or else I must say the same that they say, and
(as Mitio saith in Terence) help to further their madness. For that crafty
wile, and subtle train of yours, I cannot perceive to what purpose it serveth,
wherewith you would have me to study and endeavour myself, if all things
cannot be made good, yet to handle them wittily and handsomely for the
purpose, that as far forth as is possible they may not be very evil. For there
is no place to dissemble in, nor to wink in. Naughty counsels must be openly
allowed and very pestilent decrees must be approved. He shall be counted worse
than a spy, yea almost as evil as a traitor, that with a faint heart doth
praise evil and noisome decrees. Moreover, a man can have no occasion to do
good chancing into the company of them which will sooner make nought a good
man, than be made good themselves: through whose evil company he shall be
marred, or else if he remain good and innocent, yet the wickedness and
foolishness of others shall be imputed to him, and laid in his neck. So that
it is impossible with that crafty wile and subtle train to turn anything to
better. Wherefore Plato by a goodly similitude declareth, why wise men refrain
to meddle in the commonwealth. For when they see the people swarm into the
streets, and daily wet to the skin with rain, and yet cannot persuade them to
go out of the rain and to take their houses, knowing well, that if they should
go out to them, they should nothing prevail, nor win ought by it, but be wet
also in the rain, they do keep themselves within their houses, being content
that they be safe themselves, seeing they cannot remedy the folly of the
people. Howbeit doubtless, Master More (to speak truly as my mind giveth me)
where soever possessions be private, where money beareth all the stroke, it is
hard and almost impossible that there the weal public may justly be governed,
and prosperously flourish. Unless you think thus: that justice is there
executed, where all things come into the hands of evil men; or that prosperity
there flourisheth, where all is divided among a few; which few nevertheless do
not lead their lives very wealthily, and the residue live miserably, wretched
and beggarly. Wherefore when I consider with myself and weigh in my mind the
wise and godly ordinances of the Utopians, among whom with very few laws all
things be so well and wealthily ordered, that virtue is had in price and
estimation, and yet, all things being there common, every man hath abundance
of everything. Again on the other part, when I compare with them so many
nations ever making new laws, yet none of them all well and sufficiently
furnished with laws; where every man calleth that he hath gotten, his own
proper and private goods; where so many new laws daily made be not sufficient
for every man to enjoy, defend, and know from another man`s that which he
calleth his own; which thing the infinite controversies in the law, that daily
rise never to be ended, plainly declare to be true. These things (I say) when
I consider with myself, I hold well with Plato, and do nothing marvel, that he
would make no laws for them, that refused those laws, whereby all men should
have and enjoy equal portions of wealths and commodities. For the wise man did
easily foresee, that this is the one and only way to the wealth of a
commonalty, if equality of all things should be brought in and established.
Which I think is not possible to be observed, where every man`s goods be
proper and peculiar to himself. For where every man under certain titles and
pretences draweth and plucketh to himself as much as he can, and so a few
divide among themselves all the riches that there is, be there never so much
abundance and store, there to the residue is left lack and poverty. And for
the most part it chanceth, that this latter sort is more worthy to enjoy that
state of wealth, than the other be: because the rich men be covetous, crafty
and unprofitable. On the otherpart the poor be lowly, simple, and by their
daily labour more profitable to the commonwealth than to themselves. Thus I do
fully persuade myself, that no equal and just distribution of things can be
made, nor that perfect wealth shall ever be among men, unless this propriety
be exiled and banished. But so long as it shall continue, so long shall remain
among the most and best part of men the heavy and inevitable burden of poverty
and wretchedness. Which, as I grant that it may be somewhat eased, so I
utterly deny that it can wholly be taken away. For if there were a statute
made, that no man should possess above a certain measure of ground, and that
no man should have in his stock above a prescript and appointed sum of money:
if it were by certain laws decreed, that neither the king should be of too
great power, neither the people too proud and wealthy, and that offices should
not be obtained by inordinate suit, or by bribes and gifts: that they should
neither be bought nor sold, nor that it should be needful for the officers, to
be at any cost or charge in their offices: for so occasion is given to the
officers by fraud and ravin to gather up their money again, and by reason of
gifts and bribes the offices be given to rich men, which should rather have
been executed of wise men: by such laws I say, like as sick bodies that be
desperate and past cure, be wont with continual good cherishing to be kept up:
so these evils also might be lightened and mitigated. But that they may be
perfectly cured, and brought to a good and upright state, it is not to be
hoped for, whiles every man is master of his own to himself. Yea, and whiles
you go about to do your cure of one part, you shall make bigger the sore of
another part, so the help of one causeth another`s harm: forasmuch as nothing
can be given to any man unless that be taken from another.
[Hear Very Few Laws]
But I am of a contrary opinion (quoth I) for methinketh that men shall
never there live wealthily, where all things be common. For how can there be
abundance of goods, or of anything, where every man withdraweth his hand from
labour? Whom the regard of his own gains driveth not to work, and the hope
that he hath in other men`s travails maketh him slothful. Then when they be
pricked with poverty, and yet no man can by any law or right defend that for
his own, which he hath gotten with the labour of his own hands, shall not
there of necessity be continual sedition and bloodshed? Specially the
authority and reverence of magistrates being taken away, which, what place it
may have with such men among whom is no difference, I cannot devise.
I marvel not (quoth he) that you be of this opinion. For you conceive in
your mind either none at all, or else a very false image and similitude of
this thing. But if you had been with me in Utopia and had presently seen
their fashions and laws, as I did, which lived there five years and more, and
would never have come thence, but only to make that new land known here: then
doubtless you would grant, that you never saw people well ordered, but only
there.
Surely (quoth Master Peter) it shall be hard for you to make me believe,
that there is better order in that new land, than is here in these countries
that we know. For good wits be as well here as there: and I think our
commonwealths be ancienter than theirs; wherein long use and experience hath
found out many things commodious for man`s life, besides that many things here
among us have been found by chance, which no wit could ever have devised.
As touching the ancientness (quoth he) of commonwealths, then you might
better judge, if you had read the histories and chronicles of that land, which
if we may believe, cities were there, before there were men here. Now what
thing soever hitherto by wit hath been devised, or found by chance, that might
be as well there as here. But I think verily, though it were so that we did
pass them in wit: yet in study and laboursome endeavour they far pass us. For
(as their chronicles testify) before our arrival there, they never heard
anything of us, whom they call the ultra-equinoctials: saving that once about
1200 years ago, a certain ship was lost by the isle of Utopia, which was
driven thither by tempest. Certain Romans and Egyptians were cast or land.
Which after that never went thence. Mark now what profit they took of this one
occasion through diligence and earnest travail. There was no craft nor science
within the empire of Rome, whereof any profit could rise, but they either
learned it of these strangers, or else of them taking occasion to search for
it, found it out. So great profit was it to them that ever any went thither
from hence. But if any like chance before this hath brought any man from
thence hither, that is as quite out of remembrance, as this also perchance in
time to come shall be forgotten, that ever I was there. And like as they
quickly, almost at the first meeting, made their own whatsoever is among us
wealthily devised: so I suppose it would be long before we would receive
anything that among them is better instituted than among us. And this I
suppose is the chief cause why their commonwealths be wiselier governed, and
do flourish in more wealth than ours, though we neither in wit nor riches be
their inferiors.
Therefore gentle Master Raphael (quoth I) I pray you and beseech you
describe unto us the island. And study not to be short: but declare largely in
order their grounds, their rivers, their cities, their people, their manners,
their ordinances, their laws, and to be short, all things, that you shall
think us desirous to know. And you shall think us desirous to know whatsoever
we know not yet.
There is nothing (quoth he) that I will do gladlier. For all these things
I have fresh in mind. But the matter requireth leisure.
Let us go in therefore (quoth I) to dinner, afterward we will bestow the
time at our pleasure.
Content (quoth he) be it.
So we went in and dined. When dinner was done, we came into the same
place again, and sat us down upon the same bench, commanding our servants that
no man should trouble us. Then I and Master Peter Giles desired Master Raphael
to perform his promise. He therefore seeing us desirous and willing to hearken
to him, when he had sat still and paused a little while, musing and be
thinking himself, thus he began to speak.
The End Of The First Book.
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